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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Case No. 970628-CA

STATE OF UTAH,

Priority No. 2

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ELMER R. MONDRAGON, JR„
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals pursuant toUtah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). Mondragon also appeals as a matter of right under Rules 3 and 4 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Mondragon was charged with three (3) counts of aggravated burglary; three (3) counts of
theft, failure to stop at a stop sign; failure to display evidence of owner security; and driving
without registration in possession. Mondragon was subsequently tried by a jury along with two
(2) other defendants in the Third District Court, Tooele County. The jury returned a verdict of
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guilty on all counts. Mondragon was given a 5 years to life sentence for each first degree felony,
to be served in the Utah State Prison. Mondragon appeals the conviction based on the arguments
contained herein.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the State violate the exclusionary rule when it called deputy Stidham as a rebuttal witness,
and did this violate Mondragon's right to a fair trial?
2. Did counsel for the State engage in prosecutorial misconduct when he inappropriately
presented evidence of a prior adult conviction of Mondragon, and did this prejudice the jury?
3. Did the State engage in prosecutorial misconduct during the cross-examination of Sharon Ortiz
when it made an inflammatory comment regarding her son's and the other defendant's
involvement with a gang, and did this violate Mondragon's right to a fair trial?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Constitution Art. 1 §7

Passim
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On or about September 25, 1997, defendant/appellant Elmer Mondragon ("Mondragon")
was tried before a jury in the Third District Court, Tooele County, State of Utah, on the charges
of three (3) counts of aggravated burglary; three (3) counts of theft; failure to stop at a stop sign;
failure to display evidence of ownership security; and driving without registration in possession.

2

Mondragon was tried jointly with two other defendants-Carlos V. Ortiz and Roger S.
Manzanares.
Prior to commencement of trial, counsel for Mondragon, in chambers, moved to exclude
all of the State's witnesses from the court room. (Exclusionary Argument Tr. 3). Counsel for the
State objected and argued that he was entitled to have a police officer knowledgeable of the case
present in the court room during trial. (Exclusionary Argument Tr. 4). In an effort to resolve the
matter, Judge Rokich suggested that both interests could be served by allowing Deputy Stidham
to remain in the court room throughout the trial, however, his testimony would be taken first, so
as to comply with the intent of the exclusionary rule and not allow Stidham to hear the testimony
of the State's or defendant's witnesses prior to his testimony. (Exclusionary Argument Tr. 6).
This was agreed to by both counsel.
Stidham testified on direct examination that one of the juveniles, Pablo Acevedo, agreed
to show Stidham and Detective Sutherland ("Sutherland") which houses were burglarized. (R.
114). Acevedo directed Stidham, who was driving his patrol vehicle, to an address on Blue Ridge
Drive in Tooele. (R. 115). The following is the relevant part of Stidham's testimony regarding
the drive with Acevedo:
Beginning at p. 115 1. 18:
(by State)

Q: All right. What did he (Acevedo) tell you about that place?
A: He stated that the purse and the phone were taken from that address.
Q: And did he take you anywhere else?
A: He then took us across town to another neighborhood, where he knew that we
3

were close [sic], but wasn't able to find the house.
Then he took us to a third neighborhood and eventually, we would [sic] up at
No. lOBenchview.
Q: And Benchview, where is that?
A: That's up on the east, southeast side of town.
Q: Is that part of the Benchmark?
A: Yeah. Yes, it is.
Q: All right. And what did he tell you about 10 Benchview?
A: He stated that the golf clubs and tools were taken from that location?
Q: All right. Were any of these items the items he had admitted taking, [sic]
himself?
A: I don't recall. He stated that he did take the telephone and one other item.
Q: I'll show you a copy of his statement, if that refreshes your memory.
A: Yes. He stated that he took the radar detector, and the cordless telephone and
the tool boxes.
Q: So, he personally did not take the golf clubs; is that correct?
A: That's correct, according to him.
Q: And he personally didn't take the purse or the cigarettes or any of the items
from Mary Bate's [sic] house?
A: That's correct.
Stidham did not testify that Acevedo implicated Mondragon during the time they drove
around Tooele looking for the homes that had been burglarized. Acevedo testified later in the
trial that he was with Garza during the burglaries. In fact, Acevedo testified that Mondragon was
never with him when he entered the garages. (R. 284).
Sutherland testified after Stidham. (R. 183). Sutherland testified that Acevedo indicated
that "all five of them would exit the vehicle" and go their separate directions. (R. 207).
Sutherland also testified that Acevedo indicated which of the items stolen were stolen by him. (R
203).
Following this new line of testimony brought out by Sutherland, Stidham was then called
4

as a rebuttal witness for the State. (R. 321). At this time Stidham materially altered his previous
testimony in order to conform to Sutherland's testimony in the following manner:

Beginning on p. 322,1. 4:
A: As we were driving around and [sic] he took us to the houses, he would
indicate which particular people went in to which particular houses.
Q: Was it always just the two juveniles?
A: No. It was not.
Q: Who else was involved?
A: He, at different houses, various locations, he named the three defendants, as
well as himself and Mr. Garza.
This was a drastic change from the testimony given by Stidham during his first
examination, not merely clarification.
The defense, during its case-in-chief, called Mondragon, to the stand so that he might
testify in his own defense. (R. 266). During cross-examination, counsel for the State presented
Mondragon with a document that had not been turned over to counsel for the defendants.
Counsel for the State asked Mondragon what the document was—Mondragon replied that it was a
prior adult conviction. (R. 271). Counsel for the defendants objected to the admissibility of the
document and it was sustained by the court. Prior to the objection, however, Mondragon had
already answered the question and informed the jury that he had a prior adult conviction. (R.
271). This misconduct by the State is obvious and more likely than not prejudiced the jury
towards all three of the defendants.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial judge in this case offered a compromise to counsel regarding the exclusionary
rule. The judge suggested that the arresting officer remain in the court room throughout the trial,
but that he would testify first so that he would not hear the testimony of the State's other
witnesses. Counsel agreed to this arrangement.
At the completion of the defendant's case, the State then called the officer in question as a
rebuttal witness and had him testify to something completely new that he had heard one of the
other witnesses for the State testify to. Mondragon intended on challenging the testimony of the
second officer because it was completely different than that of the officer that had testified first.
Counsel for the State presented evidence of a prior adult conviction of Mondragon while
he was testifying on his own behalf. This was objected to and sustained by the trial court.
Defense counsel had filed a Request for Discovery in a timely fashion and was not furnished with
this document. Such behavior amounts to prosecutorial misconduct.
Counsel for the State also exceeded the scope of the direct-examination of Sharon Ortiz.
The only testimony solicited from this witness on direct-examination were questions regarding the
registration and insurance of the vehicle allegedly used in the burglaries. The first question asked
by the State on cross-examination was, "I'm going to ask you some questions regarding your
son's involvement with the Serenos 13 gang." Counsel for the State knew, or reasonably should
have known, that such an inappropriate question would be objected to and sustained by the court.
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Mondragon argues that the State intentionally attempted to prejudice the jury with this comment.
ARGUMENT
1. The State violated the exclusionary rule and committed prosecutorial misconduct bv having
Deputy Stidham testify as a rebuttal witness.
Stidham never testified on direct examination that Acevedo indicated which homes were
burglarized by which defendants. Stidham only testified to such fact after he heard the testimony
of Sutherland which indicated that all three of the defendants were involved. Such action
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.
In State v Tennev. 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah App. 1996), the court held that a jury verdict
will be reversed on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct if the defendant demonstrates that:
[t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call to the attention of the jury a
matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, if so,
under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial and
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there
would have been a more favorable result.

The State would argue that having Stidham testify as a rebuttal witness on a totally new
area merely clarified his previous testimony. That proposition fails after an examination of the
record. In State v Rangel. 866 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1993), the victim was allowed to remain in
the court room throughout the trial. The prosecutor argued that the victim would only correct
some errors in her earlier testimony which had nothing to do with the testimony given by any
other witnesses for the State. The trial court allowed the victim to retake the stand. After the
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victim had testified, the State rested. After completion of the defendant's case the State again
called the victim to the stand without objection from defense counsel. The court of appeals
stated:
While allowing J.W. to testify both at the beginning and end of the prosecution's
case could possibly result in unfairness, the record in this case clearly shows no
prejudice. J.W. did not conform her testimony to the testimony of others. Rather,
she simply clarified and added to her testimony from the day before on topics not
covered by any other witnesses. J.W. 's additional testimony in no way
compromised the procedural fairness of defendant's trail.
Rangel is distinguishable from the present case because Stidham did conform his testimony
to the testimony of others—namely Sutherland. Rangel is also distinguishable by the fact that the
State agreed to have Stidham testify first so that he would not hear the testimony of any other
witnesses examined by the State prior to his testimony. Mondragon does not challenge the
discretion of the trial judge in this matter, rather he argues that the State's action constitute
prosecutorial misconduct which prejudiced Mondragon's right to a fair trial—thus, the verdict
should be set aside in the interests of justice
The jury considered matters they should not have heard when the State engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct. {See, State v Tenney. supra.) Stidham never testified that Acevedo
implicated Mondragon in the burglaries during the drive with him and Sutherland. Stidham only
testified to this after he heard the testimony of Sutherland-he then altered his original testimony
to conform to Sutherland's. Counsel for the State should have reasonably known that soliciting
such testimony could prejudice the jury because the evidence was only presented after Sutherland
8

had testified that Acevedo had implicated the defendants Such evidence clearly violated the
exclusionary rule arrangement agreed to by the State. Such evidence, if true, should have been
solicited during the direct examination of Stidham.
Mondragon argues that he intended to challenge the testimony of Sutherland during
closing arguments because Sutherland testified to something completely different than did
Stidham. It is reasonable to conclude that the jury may not have believed the testimony of
Sutherland when such testimony differed from that given by Stidham on the same subject.
II Counsel for the State illegally presented evidence of Mondragon's prior conviction
Counsel for the State presented a document to Mondragon during cross-examination that
had not been turned over to defense counsel after a Request for Discovery had been filed
Counsel for the State asked what the document was, and Mondragon responded that it was a
prior adult conviction. The jury heard the response before defense counsel could object Such
action constitutes prosecutorial misconduct because the State knowingly brought to the attention
of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict. (See, State
v Tenney. supra) Mondragon argues that such misconduct prejudiced the jury not only towards
Mondragon but also towards Ortiz because the three defendants were tried jointly.
In State v Hay. 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993), the Court held that the State had a duty to
turn over evidence to the defense that it had in its possession. The prosecutor in that case failed
to turn over a knife to the defense that the defendant claimed had been used by the victim to
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attack him. The Court stated:
[w]e think that the prosecution acted improperly when it did not offer the knife
directly to the defense...It is important to emphasize that the prosecution has a
duty to provide discovery materials to the defense on request. This duty extends
to unrequested information that is or may be exculpatory. Rule 3.8(d) of the Rules
of Professional Conduct requires a prosecutor to "[mjake timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense." Indeed, it is a violation of
due process not to do so, whether or not the defense requests that information.

Id.
The Court continued by holding that "the prosecution's responsibility is that of a minister
of justice and not simply that of an advocate... a criminal trial is more than a contest between the
prosecution and the defense; it is a search for the truth." Id
Counsel for the State in the present case had no right to present such evidence to the jury.
He knew, or should have known, that the evidence was inadmissable and would likely be excluded
by the court. Mondragon argues that his right to a fair trial was violated by the State's
misconduct, and that a new trial should therefore be granted. Had defense counsel been aware
that the State was in possession of such a document, Mondragon would not have taken the stand
Mondragon would not have been prejudiced by this document but for the prosecutor's
misconduct.

III. The State committed prosecutorial misconduct by asking an inflammatory question during its
cross-examination of Sharon Ortiz.
Sharon Ortiz was called as a witness during the defendant's case-in-chief The only
10

subject explored by defense counsel concerned the existence of proof of insurance and registration
of the vehicle which was alleged to have been used in the burglaries. Counsel for the State, as he
began his cross-examination, immediately made a comment regarding her son's and the other
defendant's affiliation with gangs. Such an attempt to prejudice the jury is clearly prosecutorial
misconduct. Counsel for the State knew or should have known that asking such an inflammatory
question would prejudice the jury. {See, State v Tenney. supra).
The record demonstrates that counsel for the State knew this line of questioning was
inappropriate.
Beginning at p. 231,1. 15:
Q: I'm going to ask you some questions about your son's involvement with the
Serenos 13 gang,
(defense counsel): Your honor, I'm going to object to that. That's not within the
scope of my direct.
The Court: The objection's sustained.
(Counsel for the State): Very well. I'll withdraw that line of questioning.
Mondragon argues that such misconduct clearly demonstrates that counsel for the State
intended to prejudice the jury. Furthermore, Mondragon submits that such behavior creates an
atmosphere that appears to be a contest between the prosecution and defense, rather than a search
for the truth by the State. {See, State v Hay, supra). Conduct by the State such as this should
not be condoned by this Court.
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CONCLUSION
Mondragon argues that the State's violation of the exclusionary rule; presenting to the
jury evidence of a prior adult conviction; and the cross-examination of Sharon Ortiz, all amount to
prosecutorial misconduct and therefore violated his right to a fair trial. Conduct such as that cited
above should not be condoned by this court. Therefore, Mondragon respectfully prays that this
court reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

Z) day of December, 1997.

Wayne A. Freestone
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 3, 1997, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief
was deposited in the Uflited States mail to the parties listed below:

Christine Soliti$
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Courtesy copy to:
Douglas AhlstrPm
Tooele County Attorney
47 South Main Street
Tooele, Utah 84074
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1997.
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ADDENDUM

No addendum is necessary for this brief.
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